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one Clark, a shareholder, director, and officer of the company,
to sign corporate checks as one of the company's two directors
required to so sign.8 0 Clark, who was personally indebted to
the drawee bank on loans relating to a separate business venture,
allegedly induced the other authorized cosigner to sign six
corporate checks, none of which contained the name of the in-
tended payee, after which Clark inserted the drawee-bank's
name as payee. The proceeds of the checks were then applied to
the payment of Clark's indebtedness to the bank. The bank,
which had mailed monthly statements to the corporation along
with the cancelled checks, apparently was unaware that Clark's
co-signer had signed the checks prior to the insertion of the
bank's name as payee. The Louisiana supreme court held that
the bank was in bad faith within the meaning of R.S. 9:3805 and
3808 when it received the first3l of the six checks, since it was
both the drawee bank and the payee of that check. This fact, said
the court, gave the bank clear evidence of a probable misap-
propriation and gave rise to a duty to inquire as to the validity
of the payment. To the bank's argument that the statute has no
application where there are two fiduciaries, the court observed
that the Statute's definition of "fiduciary" includes "any . .. per-
sons acting in a fiduciary capacity," 2 and that it could not be
said that the co-fiduciary had not violated fiduciary obligations






The statute governing the issuance of certificates and per-
mits to motor carriers contains no provision with respect to
30. The corporation originally gave Clark authority to issue checks on
his signature alone. The bank, however, demanded a co-signer.
31. In the absence of prior Supreme Court interpretation of the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act, the court relied upon the decision in Maryland Casualty
Go. v. Bank of Charlotte, 340 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1965), which held on similar
facts that the bank was liable on all but the first of a series of checks under
the same provisions of the Act.
32. LA. R.S. 9:3801(2) (1950).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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amending such certificates except for failure to comply with the
law and then only after a notice and hearing. The commission
has on occasion, however, utilized a "correction procedure" for
the rectification of clerical errors without hearing. In Herrin
Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission,1 the commis-
sion utilized such a procedure to "correct" an order granting a
contract carrier permit which had become final some twenty-
two years previously. The original permit had authorized the
transportation of "[h]ousehold goods and office equipment";
"heavy machinery and related articles requiring special han-
dling or services."'2 The alleged correction deleted the word "re-
lated" before articles, thus broadening the permit so as to au-
thorize the transportation of all articles requiring special han-
dling or services. 8 Our supreme court found that this was clearly
a substantive change in the permit, not the correction of an
inadvertent insertion, and hence could issue only after notice
and hearing.4 The court relied upon principles of res judicata
and lack of statutory authority in holding that the commission
was without power to amend an order which had become final
through expiration of the appeal. The use of the "correction
procedure" in this instance was termed by the court a circum-
vention of statutory procedures. In White v. Public Service
Commission,5 involving the issuance of a certificate to a radio
common carrier service, while a hearing had been held, specific
findings were not made on the issue of inadequacy of present
service; the matter was remanded to the commission. Specific
findings were deemed necessary in light of the fact that the
record clearly showed competition and duplication of service
would result from the order. In these circumstances the court
found the statute explicit that a hearing on reasonable notice
as to the inadequacy of present service was to be held.6 In order
to insure adequate judicial review the commission was directed
to prepare a record containing evidence with respect to ade-
quacy or inadequacy of service and specific fiindings with re-
spect thereto by the commission.7 The district court was also
found to have committed reversible error in permitting the
1. 261 La. 977, 261 So.2d 635 (1972).
2. Id. at 979, 261 So.2d at 636.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 981, 261 So.2d at 637.
5. 259 La. 363, 250 So.2d 368 (1971).
6. Id. at 378, 250 So.2d at 373.
7. Id. at 381, 250 So.2d at 374.
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introduction of evidence in court without the required stipula-
tion from the parties, waiving prior reference to the commis-
sion.8
In 1958 the legislature sought to eliminate trafficking in
dormant motor carrier certificates and permits by providing that
such certificates or permits were subject to cancellation upon
motion of the commission or other interested party upon non-
use for a period of six months; it also proscribed the transfer
of such certificates or permits unless the prior owner had sub-
stantially operated all rights thereunder for a period of six con-
secutive months immediately prior to transfer. However, an
exception was provided if "failure to so operate was due to bank-
ruptcy, receivership, or other legal proceedings, or to other
causes beyond his or its control."9 In Matlack, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, 0 a permit issued to a subsidiary of Mat-
lack in 1957 was cancelled under the commission's authority
with respect to dormant permits. The commission took the posi-
tion that the permit was subject to cancellation because it had
clearly at one time or another been dormant for a period of six
months, although the rights under the permit had been substan-
tially operated for a period of a year prior to cancellation."
The supreme court viewed the statute as ambiguous in that the
same requirements as to substantial operation were not included
in the non-user cancellation authorization as in the provision
proscribing transfers.12 To clarify ambiguity, the court con-
cluded, the six months non-user period must immediately pre-
cede either the attempted transfer or cancellation by the com-
mission; ambiguity, the court noted, citing encyclopedic juris-
prudence, may arise from the fact that "'giving a literal inter-
pretation to the words would lead to such unreasonable, injust,
impracticable, or absurd consequences as to compel a conviction
that they could not have been intended by the Legislature.' 13
In Communications Industries, Inc. v. Public Service Corn,
mission, 4 the supreme court disposed of a question left open in
the White case as to whether a hearing for the serving carrier,
8. Id. at 372-73, 250 So.2d at 371-72.
9. LA. R.S. 45:166(B)(c) (1950).
10. 260 La. 359, 256 So.2d 118 (1972).
11. Id. at 364, 256 So.2d at 120.
12. Id. at 368-69, 256 So.2d at 121.
13. Id. (Citations omitted.)
14. 260 La. 1, 254 So.2d 613 (1971).
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on the adequacy of present service and ability to provide ade-
quate service if not presently being rendered, must be separate
from the hearing on a new application to render duplicating
service. The court concluded that one hearing upon reasonable
notice was all that was required under the statute.15
CIVIL SERVICE COMVMISSION
For many years, rules of the Civil Service Commission have
provided that a notice of appeal must "contain a clear and con-
cise statement of the action complained against and the basis
of the appeal."' 0 The rules have also provided for summary dis-
missal of appeals at the instance of the appointing authority
when the "appeal has not been made in the required manner or
within the prescribed period of delay."11 The commission has
generally been upheld in its interpretation of the rule that more
is required than mere conclusory allegations and that the spe-
cific actions upon which the appeal is based must be set forth
in the notice of appeal.18 The procedure of the commission might
be said to track generally the requirement of fact pleading in
the state courts and to require more than the Federal Rule,
which merely prescribes that a claim for relief contain a "short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief . . . ."19 In Smith v. Board of Commissioners,20
the employee filed notice of appeal complaining that he had
"been demoted, dismissed, discriminated against, and subjected
to disciplinary action contrary to the provisions of amendment 21
and rules of this commission. '22 He also complained in the notice
that he "has been deprived of his rights, discriminated against,
and adversely affected by violations of the provisions of the
amendment and rules of this commission. 2 8 The notice of appeal
did not deny the truthfulness of the employing authority alle-
15. Id. at 8-10, 254 So.2d at 615-16. For a more detailed description of
procedure under the Federal Motor Carrier Act, see ICC v. J-T Transport
Co., 368 U. S. 81 (1961), commented upon in Symposium, 32 LA. L. REV.
271, 272 (1972).
16. LA. CIV. SERV. R. 13.11(d).
17. Id. at R. 13.14(a).
18. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 249 So.2d 279, 281 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971).
19. 28 U.S.C. R. 8(a)(2) (1970).
20. 262 La. 96, 262 So.2d 383 (1972).
21. LA. CONST. art. XIV.
22. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 249 So.2d 279 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
23. 249 So.2d at 280.
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gations and did not describe the nature of the discrimination
or deprivation of which the employee complained. The court of
appeal upheld a dismissal under the rules of the commission
on the ground that the notice of appeal had failed to set forth
any motive, misconduct, or other action on the part of the em-
ploying authority.24 On review by the supreme court, it was
held that "[a]lthough the complaint lacks substantial detail, it
is sufficient in our opinion to maintain the appeal."2 5 The court
rested its action primarily on the ground that it found no re-
quirement in the rules that the notice deny seriatim each perti-
nent sentence in the letter of dismissal of the employing au-
thority and was satisfied that "[t]he fair import of the notice
is that the dismissal was unfounded and erroneous. '26 It quoted
from a trial court appeal that "[t]he law is too well settled to
require the citation of authority that appeals are favored in the
law, must be maintained wherever possible, and will not be dis-
missed for technicalities."27 It seems a fair inference that the
court so regarded the commission requirement of a "clear and
concise statement of the action complained against" and that
in agency pleading we may be moving toward the notice plead-
ing of the Federal Rules.
While the Smith case was under review by the supreme
court, a court of appeal decided Newbrough v. State, Department
of Highways.2 8 There, the Department had dismissed an em-
ployee on the ground that he was physically unable to discharge
his duties. An appeal was taken to the commission; the appeal
was dismissed on the ground that the notice failed to set forth
a clear and concise statement of the action complained against
in that it did not allege that at the time he presented himself
for return to work he was physically able to resume his duties.
In this case, notice of appeal took the form of a somewhat con-
fused letter statement of facts but which did include a reference
to a doctor's certificate evidencing his ability to return to work.
From all of this, the commission was directed by the reviewing
court to infer that the notice met the letter and spirit of the
rule although not "couched in the most acceptable form of termi-
24. Id. at 281.
25. 262 So.2d at 385.
26. Id.
27. Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 245 La. 411, 424, 158 So.2d 594, 599
(1963).
28. 257 So.2d 461 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
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nology."29 Employee was not expected, said the court, to deny
or refute all allegations made against him so long as the basis
of the appeal is set forth. In Newbrough, the commission's plead-
ing requirements with respect to specifically denying or refuting
all allegations are thus softened to a requirement analogous to
the Smith requirement that the notice shall convey a "fair im-
port" of denial, though lacking desirable specificity.
In Carpenter v. Confederate Memorial Medical Center,80 an
employee had apparently been harried into signing an instru-
ment which was then treated by the employing authority as a
voluntary resignation and was deemed to eliminate the need for
a letter of dismissal with a statement of charges that the employee
was unable to do the work properly. A notice of appeal recited
these circumstances and requested a determination by the com-
mission. The notice was not filed within the requisite 30 days
although an informal letter had been addressed timely to the
commission; it was dismissed on motion of the employing au-
thority on the ground that the appeal contained no reference to
a written notice of discharge and was not timely. The court of
appeal reversed the dismissal, noting that it has consistently
been held that an employee does not lose his right of appeal
within thirty days of only oral notification and that such a dis-
charge is totally ineffective.8 ' The commission was directed to
hear the appeal on the merits.
Waldrop v. Louisiana State University,82 involved employee's
charge that she had been discriminated against in her dismissal.
On court review, the argument was rejected that commission's
criteria for the determination of job ratings as satisfactory and
unsatisfactory were illegal because they were not "objective"
standards by which to gauge the qualifications of an employee
in comparison with other similar employees. The court found
that these criteria, when applied to the adjudicative facts as to
quantity of work, quality of work, and adaptability of the em-
ployee were adequate although not purely objective standards.
The court refused to "weigh" the evidence but found that the
record contained evidence which supported the commission's
29. Id. at 464.
30. 250 So.2d 161 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1971).
81. Young v. Charity Hospital, 226 La. 708, 77 So.2d 13 (1954), commented
on in Symposium, 16 LA. L. REv. 282 (1956).
82. 255 So.2d 413 (IL App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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finding that employee had failed to establish her charge of dis-
crimination.88
A final chapter in the saga of Cormier v. Board of Institu-:
tions84 was written by a court of appeal in upholding mandamus
against the Department of Corrections directing the department
to pay Cormier back-salary as well as hospital and living ex-
penses which he would have received had he been allowed to
continue in his position.'6 Recovery of the fair value of living
expenses which would have been defrayed by the department
would seem to pose an interesting income tax question, since if
Mr. Cormier was required for the convenience of his employer
to live on the premises such fair value of living expenses would
not have been taxable income to him. The theory of non-tax-
ability is of course that living on the premises in such circum-
stances is a part of the service rendered rather than compensa-
tion received, since he is deprived of choosing his "life style."
If he did not actually render such services, and was not so de-
prived, it would appear the fair value of such expense would
now be taxable. 6
During the last term, the supreme court had the task, in
Bonnette v. Karst,8 of reconciling the mandatory retirement
provisions statutorily required under the state employees' re-
tirement system, 8 with the "tenure during good behavior" pro-
vided in one of the constitutional municipal civil service sys-
tems.89 A three-judge district court held that the constitutional
provision for tenure during good behavior took precedence over
a legislative provision for mandatory retirement at age 65 for
pension purposes. The supreme court was deeply split on the
issue but on rehearing finally construed the constitutional pro-
vision for tenure "during good behavior" as not contemplating
lifetime tenure but rather tenure which could only be termi-
nated by charges after hearing.4
33. Id. at 417.
34. 230 So.2d 307 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1969) commented on in Symposium,
31 LA. L. R.v. 292, 297 (1971).
35. State Civil Service Comm'r v. Dep't of Corrections, 251 So.2d 524
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a) (1956).
37. 261 La. 850, 261 So.2d 589 (1972).
38. LA. R.S. 42:691 (1950).
89. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15.1(30).
40. 261 La. at 889-94, 261 So.2d at 604-05.
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SCHOOL BoARDs
In Stewart v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board,41 the
board "admitted and treated a judgment of divorce on the ground
of adultery as evidence of and conclusive proof of immorality,"
engaging in immoral conduct being a ground for dismissal of
tenured school bus operators. On appeal, the employee alleged
that dismissal on the basis of such a finding amounted to a de-
privation without due process of law inasmuch as the conduct
found to constitute immoral conduct had no effect upon or re-
lation to the performance of her job duties and had no effect
upon the public interest. The court of appeal treated the issue
as only one of "sufficient proof of immorality to justify [the
board's] decision," and having found the evidence substantial,
refused to interfere further in the discretion of the board, al-
though it seems clear that the constitutional argument was being
made that the finding was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion
and hence not due process of law.42 In Brickman v. New Orleans
Aviation Board,48 the supreme court held that "inability to work
with others" was not a valid cause for dismissal under the civil
service law unless it was further explicitly expanded to mean
"inability to work with others" in circumstances where such
work quality is "prejudicial to the efficiency of the public ser-
vice."4 4 By analogy, such an argument might have been made
in Stewart.
Last term, in Hayes v. Orleans Parish School Board,4 5 the
supreme court ruled that transfers into lesser positions brought
about by the termination of federal aid programs were within
the general powers of administration of school boards without
limitation by tenure restrictions. In Pardue v. Livingston Parish
School Board,4 the First Circuit now holds (in circumstances
where no curtailment of federal funds was involved but com-
pliance with a faculty integration order was involved) that a
guidance counsellor would be demoted and tenure restrictions
would be violated if removed from her position and assigned
41. 251 So.2d 487 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
42. Id. at 490.
43. 236 La. 143, 107 So.2d 422 (1958) commented on in Symposium, 20 LA.
L. RE v. 268, 272 (1960).
44. Id. at 167, 107 So.2d at 431.
45. 256 La. 677, 237 So.2d 681 (1970), commented on in Symposium, 32
LA. L. REv. 271, 284 (1972).
46. 251 So.2d 833 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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as an English teacher.47 The Hayes case was not referred to by
the court.
In Bowen v. Doyal,4 8 the supreme court has construed section
36 of article VII of the Louisiana Constitution, delineating the
appellate jurisdiction of district courts, so as not to preclude
statutorily limited judicial review of agency action upon the
record as made before the agency. The present decision over-
rules Albert v. Parish of Rapides,49 in which the court espoused
the theory that a party dissatisfied with agency action was lim-
ited to bringing a suit via ordinaria under the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. The majority now holds that review may be obtained by
filing an original action in the district court which action may
depart from an ordinary suit in that limitations on the scope of
review imposed by the legislature may be respected. 5° While
numerous statutes use the term "appeal" of an administrative
order, the court notes that "[j]udicial review of administrative
determinations should not be confused with judicial appeals";51
such writs are to be deemed an invocation of original judicial
jurisdiction and hence not proscribed by section 36 of article VII
of the Constitution. The court notes the existence of a pre-
sumption that all administrative determinations are reviewable
by the court and that, in view of due process, "judicial review
may even be necessary in the face of legislative attempt to deny
it .... "2 Since the Division of Employment Security is ex-
empted from the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act,5 3
that statute was not in issue. However, the decision of the court
would seem to apply equally to petitions for judicial review
under that act.
In Heard v. Doyal 54 the petition for review was not at-
tacked on the jurisdictional grounds urged in Bowen. Error was
urged in that employer had not carried the burden of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence as to alleged misconduct, relied
47. 251 So.2d at 835.
48. 259 La. 839, 253 So.2d 200 (1971). See also, Geystand v. Doyal, 259 La.
862, 253 So.2d 209 (1971).
49. 256 La. 566, 237 So.2d 380 (1970).
50. 259 La. at 848-52, 253 So.2d at 204-05.
51. Id. at 852, 253 So.2d at 204.
52. Id.
53. LA. R.S. 49:962-64 (1950).
54. 259 So.2d 412 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
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upon as a basis for denying benefits. The court did not espouse
the preponderance rule but, guided by statute, reached the con-
clusion that the finding by the agency was not supported by
"sufficient" evidence, holding that no evidence whatsoever sup-
ported the finding of misconduct.55 The court quoted approv-
ingly a version of the substantial evidence rule to the effect
that "[w]hen the evidence is open to several reasonable con-
structions, the court should accept the construction or inter-
pretation of the evidence reasonably made by the administra-
tive agency.' '5 Since here there was no evidence of misconduct
as to which an "interpretation" could reasonably be made by
the agency, the court's result could have been reached while
still honoring this rule.
Amendments to the Minimum Housing Standards Code for
the City of New Orleans T authorize officials to determine
whether prescribed standards have been violated and, where
violations are found, to advise the owner that, upon failure
to make necessary repairs, official repair of the premises may
be ordered, with the cost of such repairs charged as a lien
against the property, subject to collection, with costs, as a
special tax. The code provides for service of notice upon the
owner and for a hearing with findings of fact to be made in
writing and an order served upon the owner requiring cor-
rection of defects on pain of the above penalties. In Tafaro's
Investment Co. v. Division of Housing Improvement," an inspec-
tion was had and findings of fact made, but with no opportunity
afforded to owner at a duly noticed hearing to answer the
allegations resulting from the inspection.59 The supreme court
held that, since a judicial function, i.e., adjudication, was being
performed by the agency, procedural safeguards must be
observed, including a full evidentiary hearing prior to entry of
the order; in entering an order for repairs prior to holding
such a hearing the agency acted contrary to constitutional
requirements of due process.60
55. Id. at 414.
56. Id.
57. NEw ORLEANS, LA., CODa, § 30-12(2) (1956).
58. 261 La. 183, 259 So.2d 57 (1972).
59. Id. at 198, 259 So.2d at 63.
60. rd. at 199, 259 So.2d at 63.
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